The U.S. Should Claim Attribution of Cyber Operations to Support the Pursuit of Political Objectives
By Nathan Weil | February 28, 2026
Many theorists have argued that military action and grand strategy conducted without a political purpose amount to mere violence. The conduct of war for war’s sake is not acceptable, and this extends to the modern battlespace that includes the information environment. One that must leverage Offensive Cyber Operations (OCO) and Defensive Cyberspace Operations-Response Actions (DCO-RA) authorities. Attribution would function as a deliberate form of strategic messaging. Effectiveness depends on policymakers knowing when acknowledgment reinforces deterrence and how the U.S. navigates gray zone ethical concerns.
Attribution bridges this divide, transforming cyber effects from silent victories into visible statecraft. A 2024 RAND study found, “Commanders are not likely to employ both kinetic and non-kinetic integrated capabilities and attempt to deliver converged effects.”[1] If the status quo continues and policymakers continually refuse to integrate attributed OCO and DCO-RA into grand strategy, then the operational planning will be a critical tool for non-kinetic signaling and deterrence. USCYBERCOM must use its authorities in a truly integrated manner, with the Joint Force’s intent to achieve political objectives through kinetic and non-kinetic vectors. Selective attribution is the missing link that fuses cyber integration with political signaling.
Publicly attributing our cyber efforts against adversaries provides decision-makers new methods for achieving political end-states in the modern operational environment. Importantly, Joint Publication 3-12, Joint Cyberspace Operations, specifically states that cyber effects must “accomplish targeting-related tasks and that support achievements of objectives,”[2] meaning that the total masking of attribution for all cyber operations through exploit and attack methods is not suitable to reach desired political end states. The Joint Staff recognizes its importance and policymakers must work to establish policy to leverage this push.
Our stagnation is trending towards failure, meanwhile, our pacing threats view cyberspace as an integral warfighting domain and exploit U.S. ethical restraints. Similar to Moscow, Beijing’s 2015 Military Strategy makes clear that People’s Republic of China links information warfare and cyber capabilities to “win future ‘informationised’ wars.”[3] Failing to call this out in a sophisticated information campaign and using similar strategies in a direct method to establish deterrence hampers our transformation to the preeminent example of a modern warfighting organization.
An apt example is Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs). These operations are a symbolic projection of the United States’ commitment to security, freedom, and free access to trade while countering dissident actors in the world like China, Russia in the Black Sea, the Houthis, and Somali pirates. FONOPs are “…essential to security and economic interests. It is a global interest, allowing… ideas to flow freely.”[4] This dialogue advocates for an information-environment equivalent of FONOPs publicized strategically when optimal. A scalpel-like approach allows the U.S. to promote their narrative, explain the exploit or attack methodology, and illuminate operational alignments with the ethical barriers that we are supposed to be bound by.
Understanding that we have a credible commitment to the world that we shall wage war and conduct operations throughout the competition continuum in good faith, honesty, and transparency, we must consider the ethical complications that could result from this shift in policy. The “Cyber Domain” is a global, interconnected web of confusion with endless amounts of entry and exit points, with an ever-increasing amount of “stealth” capabilities that hamper distinguishability between adversaries and allies. Essentially, the ability to attribute, create AORs and deconflict non-combatant entities in the cyber domain will make the ethical portions of OCO and DCO-RA incredibly hard to justify based on current perceptions of sovereignty, privacy, and the codified Law of Armed Conflict.
In this new age, despite the ethical concerns, the U.S. has previously already declared its intent to use cyberspace as a vector for gray zone actions. The 2023 Cyber Strategy Fact Sheet states, “The Department will campaign in and through cyberspace below the level of armed conflict to reinforce deterrence and frustrate adversaries.”[5] We have failed to do this, at least overtly.
James M. McPherson echoed Clausewitz when he wrote, “The key to victory lay in defining a political goal that military action could achieve, and in directing that action consistently toward that goal.”[6] Failure to implement strategic guidance to exercise OCO and DCO-RA as a vector for achieving political means throughout the competition continuum will limit the DoD’s ability to grasp the full scope of gray zone operations.
This shift needs to be precise and sophisticated; most importantly, effects cannot hide behind lock and key from the public eye when we successfully actioned through OCO and DCO-RA authorities in support of information warfare. CYBERCOM must fully integrate with The Executive to action these overt uses of cyber and if we fail to do so, then we will continue to lose below the threshold of conflict, inherently worsening our battlespace shaping and deterrence abilities across all domains.
Reference
[1] RAND Corporation, Assessing Cyber Operations Integration in U.S. Military Planning (2024), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1934-1.html.
[2] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-12: Joint Cyber Operations (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2022).
[3] Center for Strategic and International Studies, A Playbook for Winning the Cyber War: Part 3: Evaluating China’s Cyber Strategy, accessed October 6, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/playbook-winning-cyber-war-part-3-evaluating-chinas-cyber-strategy.
[4] U.S. Department of Defense, Freedom of Navigation Program Fact Sheet (February 28, 2017), https://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/DoD%20FON%20Program%20Summary%2016.pdf?ver=2017-03-03-141350-380.
[5] U.S. Department of Defense, 2023 DoD Cyber Strategy Fact Sheet (May 26, 2023), https://media.defense.gov/2023/May/26/2003231006/-1/-1/1/2023-DOD-CYBER-STRATEGY-FACT-SHEET.PDF.
[6] James M. McPherson, Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief (Washington, D.C.: Penguin Group, 2009).
ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
Nathan Weil is a student at George Mason’s Schar School for Policy and Government, pursuing a Master’s degree in International Security. Nathan is a Marine Corps veteran and is currently a government civilian supporting the Marine Corps expansion into space programs and intelligence integration.
